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I. INTRODUCTION
My comments today are designed to map a preliminary field
of analysis through which to begin articulating a LatCrit per-
spective on international law. I begin with the simple observa-
" Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.
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tions that global capitalism and the interstate system are under-
going fundamental restructuring' and that this restructuring
has already had and will continue to have profound impact on
the lives of Latinas/os, both in the United States and in Latin
America.2 To intervene effectively, the LatCrit movement needs
to develop the conceptual resources that can help us understand
the competing world orders embedded in these processes, assess
their implications for the different communities whose common
interests we seek to identify and purport to represent, and de-
velop the political alliances we need in order to effect pro-active
reforms.
I would like to focus on four models for linking the enforce-
ment of international human rights to the development of inter-
national economic law.8 After briefly describing each linkage
model, I explore some of the difficulties involved in attempting to
locate Latinas/os in the debates over these linkages or, more
precisely, the difficulties involved in identifying a critical per-
spective from which to evaluate these alternative linkage re-
gimes. Through the discussion of the four models, you will see
why this can be a very difficult task. These four models are re-
flected in (1) U.S. statutes imposing labor rights conditionality
on developing countries seeking preferential access to U.S. mar-
1. See generally Elizabeth M. Iglesias, La Transformacidn Econdrnica y El
Movimiento Obrero Estaounidense [Economic Crisis and the United Labor Movement], 4
EL OTRO DERECHO 5-29 (1992) (exploring two different accounts of the current economic
crisis and the need to promote international labor solidarity focused on the policies and
procedures of economic institutions and legal regimes like the GATT and the IMF).
2. See IN THE BARRIOS: LATINOS AND THE UNDERCLASS DEBATE (Joan Moore &
Raquel Pinderhuges eds., 1993) (exploring the impact of economic restructuring on dif-
ferent Latino communities in the United States). See generally Michael Knoll, Perchance
to Dream, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1599 (1993) (discussing the effect of economic globalization
on domestic income distribution and the disappearance of the middle class). For ac-
counts of the impact of economic restructuring on Latinaslos in Latin America, see
Manuel Fuentes Muniz, The Nafta Labor Side Accord in Mexico and Its Repercussions for
Workers, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 379 (1995) (examining the impact of U.S. style of indus-
trialization on Mexican workers); Efren Cordova, The Challenge of Flexibility in Latin
America, 17 COMP. LAB. L.J. 314 (1996).
3. The four models I examine do not exhaust the legal regimes, actual and pro-
posed, through which the enforcement of human rights could be linked to the procedures,
substantive norms, and institutional arrangements of international economic law. Nev-
ertheless, these four models do provide a useful point of reference for making some im-
portant observations about the need to integrate human rights enforcement into the do-
main of international economic law and the issues at stake in the different regime
structures through which such integration might be effected. In any event, my com-
ments are offered as reflections on the kind of issues a mare systematic analysis will
need to elaborate.
[Vol. 28:2
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
kets; (2) the regional arrangement embodied in the North Ameri-
can Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), otherwise
known as the NAFTA Labor Side Accord; (3) the U.S. embargo of
Cuba, read as an effort to promote the so-called right to demo-
cratic governance; and (4) proposals to link the enforcement of
international human rights to the decision-making processes of
the World Bank.
The difficulties begin with the observation that each linkage
regime offers a different legal trajectory for the future world or-
der, spanning an imaginary continuum of possibilities. At one
end, the failure to devise effective linkages may contribute to or
reflect, or both, a complete capitulation of international law and
the nation-state to the processes of anarcho-capitalism. At the
other end, the struggle for increasingly effective and compre-
hensive linkages may promote processes that might eventually
produce a one world government. The contest between these al-
ternative trajectories for global governance, in turn, bears di-
rectly on the prospects for eliminating Latina/o poverty as well
as for the continued viability of many Latin cultural traditions
and identities, both in the United States and Latin America.
4
These difficulties are further exacerbated by the concerns
and commitments LatCrit scholars have inherited from the
RaceCrit movement-most specifically, concerns about the theo-
retical and practical impact of "essentialism" in legal discourse
and a commitment to explore and identify the differences, as
well as the commonalities within and between subordinated
groups. 5 That LatCrit theory should focus on international law
makes particularly good sense given the impact of international
processes and regime structures on Latin communities; however,
4. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Trade Policy: The Normative Dimension, 25 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 211, 216-17 (1993) (noting that free trade may undermine a "particular
way of life" and that in some countries there is a "general interest in preserving local cul-
ture which extends beyond the narrow economic benefit to certain sectors").
5. "Essentialism" means different things in different contexts. Here it is a label
applied to the claim that a particular perspective reflects the common experiences and
interests of a broader group. It is generally deployed by individuals and sub-groups
seeking to resist the suppression of intragroup differences. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Igle-
sias, Structures of Subordination: Women of Color at the Intersection of Title VII and
NLRA. Not t, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 395 (1993) (challenging the way the class essen-
tialism embedded in American labor laws and the race essentialism embedded in the
employment discrimination laws interact to produce a pattern of legal decisions that sys-
tematically ignore the collective interests and suppress the transformative agency of
women of color in the workplace).
1996-97]
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for LatCrit scholars, the debate over different human rights
linkage regimes must be located within a broader debate over
the normative commitments of the LatCrit movement.
Proposals to enforce human rights through the institutions
and procedures established by international economic law are
designed to change the conditions of production, investment, and
trade in order to achieve specific substantive ends, such as in-
creased respect for workers' rights to organize and bargain col-
lectively, and rights to democratic participation, to food, and to a
healthy environment. These substantive ends are controversial,
and not all Latinas/os are similarly situated in relation to the
economic arrangements, political institutions, cultural processes,
and interstate structures that would be transformed by different
linkage regimes designed to achieve these ends.
On the contrary, Latinas/os occupy many different positions
in national and international structures of class, race, and gen-
der hierarchy, just as different Latin communities occupy differ-
ent positions in relation to the political processes of the state and
the historical processes of colonialism and American expansion-
ism.6 These differences underscore the importance of identifying
the points of reference, that is, the perspective from which the
LatCrit movement will be "critical." Put differently, the anti-
essentialist imperative does not derive from some abstract philo-
sophical ideal, but rather from the imperative of practical poli-
tics, that is, the need to find the appropriate starting point from
which to construct effective alliances, to coordinate advocacy,
and to promote progressive reforms. 7
After briefly describing the four linkage models, I proceed
into this quagmire of multiple (and apparently incommensura-
ble) Latina/o interests and identities by proposing to read these
differences as artifacts of the way different discourses encourage
Latinas/os to identify our interests and construct our political
6. See IN THE BARRIOS, supra note 2, at xvi-xx (linking differences among Puerto
Rican, Cuban, and Mexican-American communities in the United States to their different
positions in the history of American economic and political expansion).
7. Robert Meister identifies the crucial questions an anti-essentialist scholarship
can help to answer: "How [do] certain group identities within a political system provide a
perspective from which it is possible to make claims against it? Why do certain social
roles form the basis of group identities around which political mobilization becomes pos-
sible? How do the conflicts of group interests that are produced by public policy enter
into the creation of those group identities that form the basis of political regimes?"
ROBERT MEISTER, POLITICAL IDENTITY: THINXING THROUGH MARX 220 (1990).
364 [Vol. 28:2
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identities. I organize my analysis of the four linkage models
around three distinct but interrelated discourses, which I call
"development," "dependency," and "neoliberalism." Each dis-
course offers different points of reference from which to assess
these four linkage regimes because each discourse identifies dis-
tinct institutional structures and social relations as the source of
the problem of Latina/o political and economic subordination.
The competing ways in which these different discourses
would constitute our critical perspectives and organize our politi-
cal alignments suggests that the most promising starting point
for LatCrit theory is in recognizing that, as individuals, Lati-
nas/os often experience our interests and identities as frag-
mented by the conflicting ways we find ourselves positioned in
various networks of intersecting social relations constructed
around the hierarchies of race, class, and gender.8 Because most
of us experience some form of both privilege and oppression, the
positions we embrace as our political identities are, to a signifi-
cant extent contestable. The likelihood that any of us will define
our interests through one identity position or another is as much
a product of the political alignments and normative commit-
ments we decide to prioritize, as it is a product of the privileges
we might seek to preserve. 9
In short, proposals to promote the enforcement of human
rights through the procedures and institutions of international
economic law, like any other reform proposals, tend to promote
different political alignments among Latinas/os depending on the
discourse through which these linkages are represented. My ap-
proach is designed to bring to the foreground the relations of
privilege and oppression that would be reinforced by adopting
the critical perspective expressed in each of the three discourses
I examine given the priorities each discourse establishes. Two
things follow. The first is that understanding how to maneuver
through these various discourses is a crucial step in combating
the manipulation of common interests and differences that might
otherwise prevent LatCrit scholarship from developing an effec-
8. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Structures of Subordination, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 395 (1993) (showing how the interpretative practices at the intersection of Title
VII and the NLRA construct a network of institutional arrangements that fragment
women of color across the political identities of race, class, and gender).
9. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups, 14 THEORY &
SOC'Y 723 (1985) (identifying intersectionality of individual identities as a crucial inde-
terminacy because it creates the space for political realignments).
1996-97] 365
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tive critique of the international processes that are reconstruct-
ing the world we inhabit. The second is a call to conscience. One
of the most important contributions LatCrit scholarship can
make is to keep reminding us that after all the discourse and de-
bate, the critical perspectives we assume are simply reflections
of the priorities we embrace.
II. FOUR MODELS FOR ENFORCING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
Each linkage model would be a good point of departure for a
more comprehensive analysis of the relationship between human
rights enforcement, development objectives, interstate relations,
and international economic law. Nevertheless, because my pri-
mary purpose here is to illustrate how different linkage models
would be analyzed through the discourses of development, de-
pendency, and neoliberalism, my discussion of these four regimes
will be general and schematic.
A. Labor Rights in United States Trade Preference
Regimes: Unilateral Conditionality
The United States has various statutes conditioning trade
relations on foreign compliance with unilaterally designated la-
bor rights. Most of these statutes are aimed at developing coun-
tries seeking preferential access to U.S. markets.' 0 The first
10. For an example of a U.S. statute imposing labor rights standards outside the
context of preferential trade arrangements, see the Overseas Private Investment Corpo-
ration Amendments Act of 1985, § 5, 22 U.S.C. § 2191a (1988)(current version at 22
U.S.C.A. § 2191a (West 1990 & West Supp. 1997)). The Overseas Private Investment
Corporation [OPIC] is a federally chartered corporate agency of the U.S. government es-
tablished to foster development in the Third World by providing insurance and financing
to private investors at favorable rates. 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1994). The laws governing
OPIC restrict participation in projects to countries whose governments are taking steps
to adopt and implement laws that extend internationally recognized workers rights to
workers in that country. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2191a (West 1990 & West Supp. 1997). The OPIC
statute defines internationally recognized labor rights by reference to the General Sys-
tem of Preferences Renewal Act of 1996, § 1952, 19 U.S.C.A. § 2467(4) (West Supp. 1997).
22 U.S.C.A. § 2191a(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997). See also Section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, as amended by the Omnibus Trade and Com-
petitiveness Act of 1988. Section 301 incorporates the denial of internationally recog-
nized workers rights into the definition of "unreasonable" acts, policies, or practices that
may constitute "unfair trade practices," thus triggering retaliatory action by the United
States. See WORKERS RIGHTS UNDER THE U.S. TRADE LAWS (Lawyers Committee for Hu-
man Rights ed., 1988).
[Vol. 28:2366
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preference scheme to incorporate labor rights conditionality was
the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), enacted
in 1983 to implement President Reagan's Caribbean Basin Ini-
tiative (CBI). 11 In 1984, the General System of Preferences Re-
newal Act added labor rights provisions to the General System of
Preferences (GSP).12 More recently, in 1991, labor rights condi-
tionality was incorporated into the Andean Trade Preference Act
of 1991.13
These trade preference programs are designed to promote
investment and economic growth in developing countries by
granting designated articles from beneficiary countries duty-free
entry into the U.S. market. The theory is that duty-free entry
will provide exports from beneficiary countries significant cost-
advantages over competing articles from non-beneficiary coun-
tries, thus generating greater sales in the United States and in-
creased production and investment in the beneficiary countries.
Because the labor conditionality provisions in these trade prefer-
ence statutes are defined by reference to the GSP Renewal Act of
1984 provisions, I will limit by discussion to the labor rights
provisions and enforcement mechanisms established by the
GSP. 14
11. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1983, 19 U.S.C. .§§ 2701-7
(1988)(current version at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-7 (1994)). The Act established seven manda-
tory and eleven discretionary criteria for determining country eligibility. Id. § 2702(b)-
(c). The labor rights provision was one of the discretionary criteria authorizing the
President to take into account "the degree to which workers in such country are afforded
reasonable workplace conditions and enjoy the rights to organize and bargain collec-
tively." Id. § 2702(c)(8). The 1983 Act was amended by the Caribbean Basin Economic
Recovery Expansion Act of 1990, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-7 (1994). Under the 1990 Act, labor
rights conditionality is one of the mandatory criteria for eligibility. Id. § 2702(b)(7). The
President may not designate any of the 27 countries as a beneficiary country if it does not
take adequate steps to afford internationally recognized worker rights. Id.
12. General System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984, 19 U.S.C. § 2461 (current
version at 19 U.S.C.A. § 2461 (West Supp. 1997)). The General System of Preferences
[GSP] program was established by Section 502 of the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
618, § 1, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified at 19 U.S.C.A. § 2101) (West. Supp. 1996), extended
through 1993 by the General System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
573, tit. 5, 98 Stat. 3018 (1984), and again by the GSP Renewal Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-188, § 1951, 110 Stat. 1917 (1996). Until the Renewal Act of 1984, the GSP con-
tained no labor rights provision.
13. 19 U.S.C. § 3202(c)(7)(1994).
14. For example, the CBEREA, like the GSP, conditions country eligibility on presi-
dential certification that the beneficiary country is "taking steps" to afford its workers
"internationally recognized worker rights." In defining these rights, the CBEREA refers
specifically to internationally recognized worker rights as defined by the GSP. See Jorge
Perez-Lopez, The Promotion of International Labor Standards, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 427,
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The General System of Preferences Renewal Act conditions
country eligibility, among other things, on a presidential certifi-
cation that the beneficiary country is "taking steps" to enforce
five "internationally recognized worker rights."15 The Act defines
"internationally recognized workers rights" to include the follow-
ing five labor rights: 1) the right of association; 2) the right to or-
ganize and bargain collectively; 3) prohibitions on the use of
forced or compulsory labor; 4) a minimum age for employment;
and 5) acceptable conditions of work, including minimum wages
and hours, and occupational safety and health.16 Although these
five rights are designated "internationally recognized," the list
excludes such fundamental labor rights as the right to be free
from employment discrimination and includes other worker
rights not deemed fundamental, at least not by the International
Labor Organization (ILO).17
The GSP statutory scheme sets up complaint and review
procedures administered by the United States Trade Represen-
tative (USTR). 18 The GSP enforcement mechanism is organized
primarily around an Annual Review process conducted by the
GSP Subcommittee, an interagency committee constituted by
representatives from the Departments of State, Commerce, Agri-
culture, and Treasury. The Subcommittee accepts petitions from
interested parties seeking removal of beneficiary countries be-
cause of their worker rights violations. It reviews these petitions
433-34 (1995). OPIC similarly tracks the GSP Renewal Act, 22 U.S.C.A. § 2191a(a)(1),
while the ATPA tracks the labor provisions of the CBEREA (which in turn tracks the
GSP). Id. at 433-34.
15. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2462(b)(2)(G) (West Supp. 1997).
16. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2467(4) (West Supp. 1997).
17. See Amy E. Belanger, Internationally Recognized Worker Rights and the Effi-
cacy of the Generalized System of Preferences: A Guatemalan Case Study, 11 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POLY 101, 114 (1996). According to Belanger, the first three GSP labor rights
are fundamental as defined by the ILO. Id. at 114 n.58 (noting the applicable ILO Con-
ventions concerning the right to organize and bargain collectively and the prohibition
against forced labor). The fourth and fifth rights, while not considered fundamental by
the ILO, are supported by various ILO Conventions. Id. at 114-15 n.59 (noting the appli-
cable ILO conventions concerning occupational safety, minimum wage, and child labor).
18. Lance A. Compa, The First Nafta Labor Cases: A New International Labor
Rights Regime Takes Shape, 3 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 159, 161-62 (1995). The Caribbean Basin
Initiative [hereinafter CBI] differs from the GSP in that it does not provide for periodic
review of a beneficiary's labor practices once the initial determination is made by the
President that the government accords the enumerated worker rights to laborers within
that country. Further, the CBI statute does not provide for interested parties to petition
for review of individual cases of worker rights violations. Thus, the initial designation of
a CBI beneficiary lasts for the duration of the preference program. WORKER RIGHTS
UNDER U.S. TRADE LAWS, supra note 10, at 33-34.
[Vol. 28:2
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in two phases. The first phase involves a preliminary determi-
nation whether the petition meets the regulatory standards for
review. 19 The second phase involves a review of the merits of
the petition and an investigation of the labor practices of the
country at issue. 20 Following review, the Subcommittee makes
recommendations to the full Trade Policy Staff Committee,
which in turn makes recommendations to the President.2 1 Sig-
nificantly, these review proceedings are not conducted pursuant
to the Administrative Procedure Act nor are the President's final
decisions subject to judicial review. 22
B. The North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation: A Multilateral Rights Regime
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
(NAALC) is the labor accord portion of the NAFTA. 23 In the de-
bate over alternative models for linking human rights to en-
forcement of international economic law, the GSP model of labor
conditionality is often compared to the labor rights regime es-
19. Regulations of the USTR Pertaining to Eligibility of Articles and Countries for
the Generalized System of Preference Program, 15 C.F.R. §§ 2007-2007.8 (1994). This
phase lasts from June 1 of each year, the deadline for submitting worker rights petitions,
through July 15th, when the Subcommittee announces in the Federal Register the peti-
tions accepted for review. Under the USTR's regulation, the Subcommittee must accept
any petition concerning worker rights unless: 1) the petition fails to satisfy the informa-
tional requirements of 15 C.F.R. § 2007.0(b) or fails to state a worker rights violation
within the meaning of the Renewal Act; or 2) the country's practices have been the sub-
ject of a previous review and the petition fails to present "substantial new information."
Id.
20. Compa, supra note 18 at 162 n.20. The Subcommittee draws its information
from the labor attach6 at the American Embassy or Consulate in the country at issue, as
well as the regional labor expert at the Department of Labor in Washington. The Sub-
committee also conducts public hearings. Interested parties may submit written briefs
and responses commenting on the country's worker rights practices. See 15 C.F.R. §§
2007 to 2007.8.
21. There is an appeal procedure if the Trade Policy Staff Committee fails to reach
a consensus and decides the case by majority vote- The dissenting agency may appeal to
the Trade Policy Review Group, composed of executive department representatives at the
under secretary level. If the dissenter is dissatisfied with the Group's decision on the
case, the case is then referred to the Economic Policy Council, composed of Cabinet
members, which reviews the case and makes a final recommendation to the President.
WORKERS RIGHTS UNDER U.S. TRADE LAWS, supra note 10, at 23-24.
22. As of 1995, the United States has removed or suspended nine countries from the
GSP program for worker rights violations: Burma, Central African Republic, Chile, Li-
beria, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Romania, and Sudan.
23. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 8, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAALC].
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tablished by the NAALC.24 This is, in part, because the NAALC
may eventually replace the GSP labor rights regime, particularly
if and when other countries in the region begin to accede to the
NAFTA.25 Equally important, the GSP and the NAALC are
worth comparing because they represent two very different link-
age models.
In the GSP model, the linkage is effected through the impo-
sition of labor standards that have been unilaterally defined by
the U.S. Congress and are interpreted and enforced through the
nonjusticiable determinations of the U.S. executive branch. The
NAALC, by contrast, is an international agreement among the
three state parties to the NAFTA which, in deference to state
sovereignty, begins by "[a]ffirming full respect for each Party's
constitution, and recognizing the right of each Party to establish
its own domestic labor standards,"26 and ends by establishing a
nonenforcement mechanism, whose sanctions can be invoked in
cases involving only three of the eleven labor standards the par-
ties have agreed to promote "to the maximum extent possible."
27
The NAALC identifies eleven "labor law matters" and sets
up a three-tiered system of review. The first tier establishes
procedures limited to review and consultation. Three of the
eleven labor rights cannot progress beyond this initial tier. These
three rights are the right of association, the right to organize and
bargain collectively, and the right to strike. Viewed as a linkage
regime, the first tier of the NAALC provides minimal enforce-
ment for these fundamental labor rights. Violations can be re-
viewed by another party's National Administrative Office and
are subject to consultation by the Labor Ministers upon the re-
quest of a state party; however, but there is no authority estab-
lished to sanction such violations. These limitations reflect the
24. See, e.g., Lance Compa, Going Multilateral" The Evolution of U.S. Hemispheric
Labor Rights Policy Under GSP and NAFTA, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 337 (1995) (comparing
the pros and cons of the unilaterally imposed conditionality of GSP versus multilaterally
negotiated rights regime of the NAALC).
25. Thus, for example, a GSP petition filed against Mexico in 1993 was rejected in
part because "[t]he negotiation of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation,
as a supplement to the NAFTA, demonstrates Mexico's determination to improve its
worker rights and provides the United States with a means for ensuring that Mexico
continues to improve its labor standards." Id. at 350. Indeed, Mexico is no longer a
beneficiary under GSP because the GSP is simply irrelevant to Mexico now that its prod-
ucts will enter the U.S. market under the provisions of NAFTA. Id. at 351.
26. NAALC, supra note 23, art. 2.
27. Id.
[Vol. 28:2
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operative impact of the concept of sovereignty in the negotiation
of the NAALC linkage regime.
The other eight labor rights are designated "technical labor
standards" and concern forced labor, child labor, minimum wage
and hour standards, employment discrimination, equal pay for
men and women, job health and safety, workers' compensation
for occupational injuries and illnesses, and protection of migrant
workers. Technical labor standards are subject to evaluation and
recommendations by an Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE).
Although the NAALC provides for fines or suspension of
trade benefits under NAFTA, these penalties can only be im-
posed after dispute resolution procedures, involving extensive
consultation, have failed. Moreover, of the eight labor standards
that can proceed beyond the first tier of review, only three of the
standards, child labor, health and safety, and minimum wage
and hour standards, can proceed to dispute resolution and pos-
sible sanctions.
C. The U.S. Embargo of Cuba: The Human Right
to Electoral Democracy and a Market Economy
If a comparison of the GSP model of labor rights conditional-
ity and the NAALC regime provides a useful point of reference
for examining the pros and cons of unilaterally imposed versus
multilaterally negotiated linkage regimes, the U.S. embargo of
Cuba adds a few more perspectives on the debate. The U.S. em-
bargo against Cuba might be viewed as a model for linking trade
and investment policies to the enforcement of human rights gen-
erally and the right to democracy in particular. Certainly, that is
the embargo's stated purpose and objective.2 8 Viewed from this
perspective, the U.S. embargo highlights many of the broader is-
sues and concerns LatCrit theory must address in determining
whether and how to link human rights enforcement to the proc-
esses and institutional arrangements of international economic
law. This is precisely because even as the U.S. embargo reflects
the unilateralism of the GSP labor conditionality model, it vastly
exceeds the scope of labor conditionality, both in terms of the
28. See, e.g., Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6001-10 (West Supp.
1997); Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C.A. §§
6021-91 (West Supp. 1997).
1996-97]
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conditionality it imposes and the enforcement mechanism it de-
ploys.
In the most recent manifestation of the U.S. embargo, the
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 conditions
the suspension of the embargo on a Presidential determination
that a "transition government" is in power in Cuba.29 Moreover,
until such transition government is replaced with a
"democratically elected government," any suspension of the em-
bargo is subject to reversal upon the enactment of a joint con-
gressional resolution.30 The Act establishes eight specific re-
quirements 31 and four additional factors 32 for determining when
29. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, 22 U.S.C.A. § 6064 (West Supp.
1997).
30. Id. § 6064(e)(1).
31. Id. § 6065(a). According to the Act:
a transition government is a government that has (1) legalized all political
activity; (2) has released all political prisoners and allowed for investigations
of Cuban prisons by appropriate international human rights organizations;
(3) has dissolved the present Department of State Security in the Cuban
Ministry of the Interior, including the Committees for the Defense of the
Revolution and the Rapid Response Brigades; and (4) has made public com-
mitments to organizing free and fair elections for a new government (A) to be
held in a timely manner within a period not to exceed 18 months after the
transition government assumes power; (B) with the participation of multiple
independent political parties that have full access to the media on an equal
basis, including (in the case of radio, television, or other telecommunications
media) in terms of allotments of time for such access and the times of day
such allotments are given; and (C) to be conducted under the supervision of
internationally recognized observers, such as the OAS, the UN and other
election monitors; (5) has ceased any interference with Radio Marti or Tele-
vision Marti broadcasts; (6) makes public commitments to and is making de-
monstrable progress in (A) establishing an independent judiciary, (B) respect-
ing internationally recognized human rights and basic freedoms as set for in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which Cuba is a signatory
nation; (C) allowing the establishment of independent trade unions as set
forth in conventions 87 and 98 of the ILO, and allowing the establishment of
independent social, economic, and political associations; (7) does not include
Fidel Castro or Raul Castro; and (8) has given adequate assurances that it
will allow the speedy and efficient distribution of assistance to the Cuban
people.
Id.
32. Id. § 6065(b). The four additional factors the President shall take into account
are the extent to which the government:
(1) is demonstrably in transition from a communist totalitarian dictatorship
to representative democracy; (2) has made public commitments to, and is
making demonstrable progress in (A) effectively guaranteeing the rights of
free speech and freedom of the press, including granting permits to privately
owned media and telecommunications companies to operate in Cuba; (B)
permitting the reinstatement of citizenship to Cuban-born persons returning
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a transition government is in power in Cuba. In a similar man-
ner, it establishes six requirements for determining when a
democratically elected government has been elected.33
As conditions precedent for suspending the embargo, these
requirements represent much more extensive interventions in
the internal domestic political and economic processes of the Cu-
ban state than either the GSP or the NAALC. First, the scope of
conditionality is expanded far beyond the obligation to respect
internationally recognized or multilaterally negotiated labor
standards to the very political form of the Cuban state and the
organization of the Cuban economy into a market-oriented eco-
nomic system based on the right to property. 34 Second, these
conditions are imposed through the unilateral enforcement of a
broad economic embargo as compared to the denial of a trade
preference under the GSP or the suspension of a trade benefit or
fines under the NAALC.
Aside from underscoring the question of the kinds of rights
that might be subject to enforcement through alternative linkage
to Cuba; (C) assuring the right to private property; and (D) taking appropri-
ate steps to return to U.S. citizens ... property taken by the Cuban govern-
ment ... on or after January 1, 1959, or to provide equitable compensation ...
for such property; (3) has extradited or otherwise rendered to the U.S. all
persons sought by the U.S. State Department of Justice for crimes committed
in the U.S.; and (4) has permitted the deployment throughout Cuba of inde-
pendent and unfettered international human rights monitors.
Id.
33. Id. § 6066. A democratically elected government is a government which:
(1) results from free and fair elections--(A) conducted under the supervision
of internationally recognized observers; and (B) in which (i) opposition parties
were permitted ample time to organize and campaign for such elections; and
(ii) all candidates were permitted full access to the media; (2) is showing re-
spect for the basic civil liberties and human rights of the citizens of Cuba; (3)
is substantially moving toward a market-oriented economic system based on
the right to own and enjoy property; (4) is committed to making constitu-
tional changes that would ensure regular free and fair elections and the full
enjoyment of basic civil liberties and human rights by the citizens of Cuba;
(5) has made demonstrable progress in establishing an independent judiciary;
and (6) has made demonstrable progress in returning ... property taken by
the U.S. government.
Id.
34. Id. §§ 6021-91. These matters have traditionally been protected from external
intervention by the international obligation to respect state sovereignty. See U.N.
CHARTER, art. 2. Article 2 commands all member nations to respect the sovereignty of all
other member nations. Id. Paragraph 1 articulates the necessity of sovereign equality of
all members. Id. Paragraph 4 explicitly states that sovereignty shall not be abridged:
"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state ... ." Id.
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regimes, the unilateralism embedded in the U.S. embargo of
Cuba raises an additional set of problems. This is because the
means used to promote respect for human rights in Cuba, the
embargo, has itself been declared illegal under international law
on the grounds that it impinges both on Cuban sovereignty and
on the freedom of third party states to trade with Cuba.3 5 The
persistence of the United States in maintaining and even tight-
ening its illegal embargo suggests that the most important
analysis may begin with the question of how to ensure that any
future linkages reflect an international consensus or, lacking
that, a normatively defensive world order model rather than
simply reflecting the geopolitical and economic interests and
ideologies of politically dominant groups in the most powerful
states.3 6
D. International Organizations: The World Bank
and the Human Right to Development
The fourth and final linkage regime shifts the frame of ref-
erence from nation-states to the activities of international or-
ganizations. This shift introduces an entirely new perspective on
some of the most crucial debates triggered by proposals to link
human rights enforcement to the development of international
economic law. Viewed through the framework of the first three
linkage models, state sovereignty appears as a fundamental,
though perhaps inevitable, limitation on the prospects for devis-
ing and implementing effective human rights linkages. Viewed
through the prism of this fourth model, however, securing re-
spect for basic human rights in the policies and practices of in-
ternational organizations is probably the last hope and most
35. See Necessity of Ending the Economic, Commercial and Financial Embargo Im-
posed by the United States of America Against Cuba, G.A. Res. 48116, U.N. GAOR, 48th
Sess., Agenda Item 30, U.N. Doc. A/Res/48/16 (1993).
36. Certainly, proponents of the embargo can assert that representative democracy
and a market-oriented economy are normatively defensible. There are two responses to
this. First, the initial question is not whether the conditionalities imposed are defensi-
ble, but whether a world order in which a super-power state can unilaterally impose such
conditionalities upon less powerful states, even in the face of universal condemnation,
constitutes a defensible model for the future world order. Secondly, the justifiability of
competing political and economic structures, like the substantive meaning and enforce-
able scope of international human rights, are precisely the issues rendered most prob-
lematic when we examine competing structures and rights regimes from the critical per-
spectives constituted by the discourses of development, dependency and neoliberalism.
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promising way to begin achieving effective sovereignty for devel-
oping countries. This is because this fourth model emphasizes
the extent to which human rights violations are generated by the
policies developing countries must often implement in order to
comply with the conditions imposed by organizations like the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
(organizations dominated, not insignificantly, by developed coun-
tries). By regulating the policies and projects these institutions
can impose on developing countries as well as the procedures
through which they operate, human rights linkages can be in-
struments for promoting effective sovereignty, democratization,
and sustainable development.
I would like to describe one proposal that fits nicely into this
fourth model. Professor Jim Paul of the Rutgers School of Law-
Newark has written extensively about the human right to devel-
opment, a right asserted in the United Nations General Assem-
bly Declaration of December 1986.31 Conceptualizing develop-
ment as "a diverse aggregate of activities carried on by a huge
international industry," Paul focuses on the impact development
projects have had on the basic human rights of affected commu-
nities. 38 These projects, often implemented through a combina-
tion of legal maneuvers, pay-offs, co-optation of local elites and
outright coercion, routinely produce development victims. Proj-
ects to construct large scale dams, commercial farming and irri-
gation projects, ranching, tourism, and the development of in-
dustrial zones have produced hundreds of thousands of displaced
persons. Victims of development displacement are, in many in-
stances, subjected to involuntary resettlement. Herded into
poorly planned and managed resettlements, they suffer "disease,
hunger, loss of livelihood, loss of self-reliance" and rarely receive
adequate compensation for the forcible removal from their lands
and property. 39
Rather than attempting to elaborate the substantive mean-
ing of development, Paul conceptualizes the human right to de-
velopment as the right to enjoy the fundamental human rights
articulated in the Universal Declaration and other international
37. Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR, 41st
Sess., Agenda Item 101, at 3-6, U.N. Doc. A/Res/41/128 (1986).
38. James C.N. Paul, The Human Right to Development: Its Meaning and Impor-
tance, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 235 (1992).
39. Id. at 239, 241.
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human rights instruments. Thus, the realization of basic human
rights, in and through the process of development, becomes the
essence of the Human right to development. This, in turn, im-
poses on development actors the obligation to respect basic hu-
man rights in designing and implementing development projects.
For Paul, the most important right implicated in the develop-
ment process is the right of participation. "The denial of full and
effective rights of participation in project activities constitutes
not only a violation of fundamental political rights central to our
concepts of human rights, but also leads directly to the violation
of other basic rights."40
By defining the Human right to development as the realiza-
tion of internationally recognized basic human rights, Paul's
formulation avoids the rhetorical traps that might otherwise be
triggered by the suggestion that the peoples of the world have a
right to development.41 By focusing on the way these rights are
incorporated into the process of development and the practices of
development actors, Paul's formulation legitimates the kinds of
grassroots mobilization necessary to assure affected communities
effective participation in and monitoring of the interventions
through which they are being developed.
Viewed as an example of the fourth linkage model, the pro-
posal offers yet another perspective on the way human rights
linkages may impact and be affected by the concept of state sov-
ereignty. Like proponents of labor conditionality and the U.S.
embargo as well as critics of the NAALC regime, Paul's formula-
tion of the human rights problem positions itself against the con-
cept of sovereignty because this concept has often been deployed
by developing country governments to shield their participation
in development wrongs. Nevertheless, by recognizing that hu-
man rights obligations govern international economic organiza-
40. Id. at 245.
41. As Paul states:
Thus, while the Declaration is cast in terms of a "Right to Development," it
should not be read as an assertion of some kind of "right" of states and peo-
ples to enjoy some undefined kind of "development." Rather, the right de-
clared is the "inalienable human right" of peoples affected by "development
processes" to realize existing, universally recognized human rights in and
through "deuelopment processes," and it is the duty of those who control these
processes to protect and promote these rights. In this way the doing of devel-
opment, like the conduct of other public affairs must be made accountable to
people.
Id. at 248.
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tions (not just developing country governments) and explicitly
limiting the purposes for and conditions under which interna-
tional organizations may conduct activities in developing coun-
tries, Paul's formulation of the Human right to development
provides a glimpse of the kinds of linkages that might help ad-
dress human rights violations generated by the structures and
processes of the international political economy. This is particu-
larly true if the Human right to development produces effective
procedural mechanisms through which affected communities
may challenge the human rights implications of investment de-
cisions, financial policies, and other activities of international
economic organizations, such as the World Bank, the IMF, and
the World Trade Organization.
III. THREE DISCOURSES FOR LOCATING LATINAS/OS IN THE
LINKAGE DEBATES
Now that I have introduced these four models for linking
human rights enforcement to the procedures and institutions of
international economic law, I will suggest some of the difficulties
involved in developing a critical perspective from which to assess
the implications of these different models for Latinas/os and the
various communities we comprise. I will do this by organizing
my analysis of these linkage models around the critical perspec-
tives offered by the three discourses I have already mentioned.
The discourses of development, dependency, and neoliberalism
each offer different points of reference from which to evaluate
these alternative linkage models because each discourse identi-
fies different institutional arrangements and social relations as
the source of the problem of Latina/o political and economic sub-
ordination. Moreover, while each discourse invites its exponents
to assess proposed linkages in terms of their likelihood of mar-
shaling the rule of law to deal with their particular version of the
problem, each discourse is contested both internally, through al-
ternative representations of the problem of subordination, and
externally through the deployment of other competing dis-
courses.
A. Development: Discourse and Counter-Discourse
By the term development discourse, I refer to a cluster of ar-
guments and representations that organize our understandings
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of the causes and cures of Latina/o economic and political sub-
ordination around accounts linking subordination to underdevel-
opment and underdevelopment to the persistence of social prac-
tices, relations, and expectations that are represented as
elements of Latin culture.42 In the United States, this discursive
construction appears in the deployment of "culture of poverty"
arguments to explain the poverty and marginalization of Latin
communities. In Latin America, this formulation is used to sup-
port arguments that the solution to economic and political sub-
ordination is to promote the assimilation of Western capitalist
cultural values and to increase the transplantation of Western
capitalist modes of production, socio-political organization, and
legal institutions.43 Since arguments for and against human
rights linkages are often articulated through the deployment of
development discourse," it is important to approach this dis-
course critically. In a longer work in progress, I take a critical
look at the cultural imperialism embedded in formulations link-
ing development to the absorption of Western cultural values,
economic arrangements, and political structures, paying particu-
lar attention to the way Latina/o identities are positioned and al-
ternative development trajectories are suppressed by these for-
42. ARTURO ESCOBAR, ENCOUNTERING DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING
OF THE THIRD WORLD 11 (1995). Escobar's discursive analysis is an effort to understand
how the "Third World" has been produced by practices of representation and intervention
that have been organized around the concept of development as well as to understand
"the variety of forms with which Third World people resist development interventions
and how they struggle to create alternative ways of being and doing." Id. at 11. It is an
effort to "unveil the foundations of an order of knowledge and discourse about the Third
World as underdeveloped." Id.
43. See Josd Joaquin Brunner, Notes on Modernity and Postmodernity in Latin
American Culture, in THE POSTMODERNISM DEBATE IN LATIN AMERICA (John Beverley et
al. eds., 1995) (criticizing "the traditional Behaviorist idea that culture needs to adapt
itself to modernity and to produce the motivations and attitudes required for the opti-
mum performance of modern systems of production, reproduction, and social rule").
Brunner argues that any such formulation ignores one of the most fundamental debates
over the meaning of modernity and modernization, particularly given the abundant evi-
dence that western capitalist model of modernity is currently in crisis. Id.
44. For example, proposals to enhance the scope and enforcement of GSP labor
rights conditionality are supported (and opposed) through arguments about the objec-
tives and pre-conditions of development. While opponents argue that labor rights condi-
tionality undermines the development objectives of the preference schemes to which they
are attached, proponents reject the notion that development can be achieved through
economic activity that ignores social impact. See, e.g., Belanger, supra note 17, at n.27
(citing INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 8 (1976) ("[D]evelopment is not a purely economic
concept but that its purpose is fundamentally social and human in character and that
economic development cannot automatically ensure social progress")).
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mulations. More specifically, I examine the way this discourse
links underdevelopment to the representation of the Latin sub-
ject as a premodern subject and Latin political culture as em-
bedded in hierarchical and authoritarian traditions.
Clearly, these representations are operative in debates over
the appropriateness of U.S. unilateralism, justifying measures
ranging from the labor rights conditionality of the GSP to the
embargo of Cuba. It is also clear that these representations help
construct a sense of the rightness and necessity of these meas-
ures, which, in turn, tends to distract us from the implications of
such unilateralism. Combating these representations is thus the
first step toward redirecting our attention. To combat them, I
begin by deploying an account of the postmodern subject of anar-
chocapitalism. If Latin subjects are embedded in a premodern
culture that prevents them from being integrated into the mod-
ern world of free market enterprise and pluralistic democracy,
the postmodern subjects of anarcho-capitalism are fragmented
and disorganized across a culture of consumerism and aliena-
tion. Similarly, I combat the representation of Latin interven-
tionist state as authoritarian and antidemocratic through an ac-
count of Western representative democracy as a gridlock of
special interest factions. The possibility suppressed by a formu-
lation that glorifies the separation of powers and identifies the
interventionist state as "the problem" is the emergence of a
"democratic hard state," that is, a state that integrates political
legitimacy and the effective power to regulate economic activity,
tax private property, and redistribute. 4
5
What I suggest today is that analyzing the linkage debate
through mainstream development discourse is problematic be-
cause this discourse presupposes that human rights linkages can
undo the socio-economic, cultural, and political impact of the
45. Tamara Lothian, The Democratized Market Economy In Latin America (And
Elsewhere): An Exercise in Institutional Thinking Within Law and Political Economy, 28
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 169, 186 (1995). According to Lothian:
[a] state is hard when it enjoys a substantial capacity to form and implement
strategies which impose the cost of public investment upon present consum-
ers and the propertied class, and a corresponding ability to resist influence by
powerful factional interests (including interests of its own partners in the
government-business partnership)... The hardness of the ... [state] limits the
proclivity toward the cannibalization of government policy by private inter-
ests. It cannot ensure strategies against illusion, but it can diminish their
vulnerability to corruption by narrow self-interest.
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trade agreements and investment decisions to which the rights
are linked. Indeed, what the counter-discourses of development
help underscore is that even the most effective human rights en-
forcement mechanisms will not produce a higher level of human
rights enjoyment if the international political economy continues
to produce political marginalization and systemic poverty for the
majority of the world's peoples. The idea that poverty will be
alleviated through the assimilation of Western economic and po-
litical models simply ignores the extent to which "the Third
World" has already been assimilated into the political economy of
global capitalism, and the extent to which Third World poverty
(and the authoritarian state) are artifacts of that assimilation.46
Human rights linkages cannot undo structurally generated pov-
erty, particularly not when the meaning of poverty and develop-
ment are themselves contested. 47
B. Dependency: Discourse and Counter-Discourse
Dependency discourse provides a second perspective on the
linkage debate. By the term dependency discourse I refer to a
cluster of arguments and representations that organize our un-
derstandings of the political and economic subordination of Latin
peoples by linking this subordination to the inequality of Latin
46. Arturo Escobar makes the point like this: "[1it is true that massive poverty in
the modern sense appeared only when the spread of the market economy broke down
community ties and deprived millions of people from access to land, water, and other re-
sources. With the consolidation of capitalism, systemic pauperization became inevita-
ble." Escobar, supra note 42, at 22.
For an account of the authoritarian state as an artifact of the social relations
organized through the process of colonialization and decolonialization, see Hamza Alavi,
The State in Post-Colonial Societies, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAW IN THE THIRD
WORLD 231-9 (Yash Ghai et al. eds., 1987). Alavi writes:
[b]efore independence members of the bureaucracy and the military were the
instruments of the colonial power ... During the freedom struggle, they were
on opposite sides of the political barricades from the leadership of the na-
tionalist movement ... After independence, the same political leaders whom it
was their task to repress were ensconced in office nominally in authority over
them.
Id. at 233. In this account, the experience of partial transfer of state power from the co-
lonial state to a dependent indigenous government explains the process through which
military circumvention of political officials was institutionalized. Id.
47. For alternative visions of "development" see KATHY MCAFEE, STORM SIGNALS:
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES IN THE CARIBBEAN (1991);
WOMEN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS A THEORETICAL
SYNTHESIS (Rosi Braidotti et al. eds., 1994).
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American states within the interstate system. Interstate ine-
quality is, in turn, linked to various accounts of the historical
processes and structural arrangements through which colonial
expansion and neo-colonial relations have rendered Third World
sovereignty a legal illusion.
By linking the elimination of subordination to a defense of
state sovereignty, dependency discourse tends to encourage
Latinas/os to identify their common interests and construct their
political alliances in ways that ignore the relations of privilege
and oppression that are organized around differential access to
the state. The defense of sovereignty is a double-edged sword
precisely because not all Latina/o communities have equal access
to or control over the state apparatus, either in the United
States or in Latin American countries. Put differently, the criti-
cal perspectives organized through dependency discourse tend to
ignore the way that conditions of subordination experienced in
Latina/o communities are linked to the different positions these
communities occupy in relation to the state. They also tend to
ignore the extent to which these differences might become even
more entrenched if the defense of sovereignty were ultimately
successful.
Second, by defining the lines of Latin solidarity around a de-
fense of sovereignty, dependency discourse also tends to suppress
the critical perspectives that might help to mobilize Latina/o le-
gal and political opposition to the current structure of the inter-
state system. Latinas/os in the United States know (or should
know) that both the terms of their immigration and their current
relationship to the U.S. state are historically and legally linked
to the nature of the political relations between the United States
and their nations of origins.48 What is not so obvious, however,
is the extent to which the interstate system of unequally power-
ful nations states is both produced by and central to the proc-
esses of uneven development, and the extent to which uneven
development is produced by and central to the reproduction of
international capitalism, as it is currently organized. 49 By or-
48. These links are evidenced, for example, by the differential treatment accorded
"economic" and "political" refugees, as well as by the non-recognition of political refugees
from "friendly" nations. See, e.g., Ari Weitzhandler, Temporary Protected Status: The
Congressional Response to the Plight of Salvadoran Aliens, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 249
(1993).
49. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER CHASE-DUNN, GLOBAL FORMATION: STRUCTURES OF THE
WORLD-ECONOMY 107-50 (1989).
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ganizing Latin political alignments around a defense of sover-
eignty, dependency discourse tends to suppress the possible
emergence of a more transformative struggle against the proc-
esses of uneven development, both in the United States and
throughout Latin America.
These points can be illustrated by examining the way de-
pendency discourse intervenes in the debate over different ar-
rangements linking human rights enforcement to international
economic law. In this context, our assessments of the human
rights linkage are made to depend on how such linkages impact
Third World sovereignty. Linkages that promote respect for the
sovereignty of Third World states or that compensate for the
weakness produced by dependency are viewed approvingly, while
linkages represented as incursions on Third World sovereignty
are viewed critically. These judgments are, in turn, justified by
different accounts of the way preserving sovereignty promotes
the human rights of Third World peoples.50
In dependency discourse, state sovereignty is at best a
meaningless legal category in a world of unequal states and
multinational business organizations, whose economic power and
hypermobility make regulation difficult, if not impossible for de-
pendent states. However, dependency discourse tends to sup-
press recognition of the fact that even the powerful core states
have been unable to prevent substantial inroads on their sover-
eignty, limitations that reflect the interests of the most powerful
players in the increasing globalization of production, investment,
and exchange, as well as domestic elites.51
50. From this perspective, not all linkage schemes are the same. Linkage regimes,
like my fourth model, that are designed to enforce respect for economic, social; and cul-
tural human rights in the policies of international organizations appear "better" than ef-
forts to link the enforcement of civil/political rights to free trade agreements. This is be-
cause the violation of individual human rights is viewed as a consequence of the violation
of the sovereignty of poorer states by Bretton Woods institutions and TNCs. A so-
cial/economic rights linkage could be used to restrain the extent to which these institu-
tions could impose economic arrangements that prevent Third World states from adopt-
ing policies that promote these economic/social rights. See, e.g., Margaret Conklin &
Daphne Davidson, The I.M.F. and Economic and Social Human Rights: A Case Study of
Argentina, 1958-85, 8 HuM. RTs. Q. 227-69 (1986). By contrast, civil/political rights link-
ages, like the labor conditionality of the GSP and the U.S. embargo of Cuba, appear to
generate a very different dynamic in which international forums and procedures become
the vehicle through which First World interests can undermine the power of Third World
states.
51. See Susan Strange, The Name of the Game, in SEA CHANGES: AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY IN A WORLD TRANSFORMED 238, 260 (Nicholas X. Rizopoulos ed., 1990).
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The substantial incursions on sovereignty, already apparent
in the current international legal order, suggest that the concept
of sovereignty operates primarily to retard the struggle to pro-
mote the enforcement of international human rights through the
development of international economic law, and the focus of
LatCrit scholars interested in promoting human rights enforce-
ment must shift from a defense of sovereignty to other alterna-
tives suppressed by dependency discourse. 52 One alternative
trajectory is international trade legalism. 53 Rather than equaliz-
ing nation states, respect for human rights may require their ul-
timate replacement by an increasingly integrated international
legal order that recognizes individuals and stakeholder groups as
the subjects of international law at all levels of the international
legal system, from norm prescription to dispute resolution.
C. Neoliberalism: Discourse and Counter-
Discourse
Neoliberal discourse provides a third perspective on the
linkage debate. Like the other two discourses, neoliberalism
provides a particular account of the reasons for and solutions to
the problems of economic and political subordination of Lati-
nas/os, both in the United States and Latin America. Moreover,
like the other two discourses, neoliberalism can be contested in-
ternally through alternative representations of the problem of
subordination and externally through the deployment of other
See also CHASE.DUNN, supra note 49. Chase-Dunn makes the point like this: "Capital is
subjected to some controls by states, but it can still flow from areas where profits are low
to areas where profits are higher. This allows capital to escape most of the political
claims which exploited classes attempt to impose on it." Id. at 141. According to Chase-
Dunn, this is true even in the case of a hegemonic core power:
when a hegemonic core power begins to lose its competitive edge in produc-
tion because of the spread of production techniques and differential labor
costs, capital is exported from the declining hegemonic core state to areas
where profit rates are higher. This reduces the level at which the capitalists
within the hegemonic core state will support the "economic nationalism" of
their home state. Their interests come to be spread across the core [and pe-
ripheral areas where they invest].
Id. at 147.
52. I would go further and argue that as between struggling for greater respect for
sovereignty and the reorganization of international law to recognize individual standing
and rights, the latter is ultimately a more worthwhile struggle-although both are
probably unattainable in the foreseeable future.
53. G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An
Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829 (1995).
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discourses. 54
Neoliberalism represents the economic and political subor-
dination of Latina/o communities as artifacts of failed statist
policies, inefficient government interventions, market rigidities,
and bureaucratic corruption.5 5 The solution to subordination is
located in reforms designed to free the market from the con-
straints imposed through these antiliberal policies and institu-
tional arrangements. Accordingly, this discourse organizes po-
litical alignments around support for and opposition to the
policies of structural adjustment, flexibilization (e.g. short-term
labor contracts), deregulation, and privatization, as well as re-
trenchment in government welfare programs, in short, the pack-
age of reforms promoted as "the Washington Consensus."56
Neoliberal discourse and policies tend to encourage Lati-
nas/os to embrace political identities and construct alliances
around their positions within domestic and international class
structures. This is because the impact of neoliberal policies, that
is the way they are experienced by different groups of Latinas/os,
depends on the way these groups are positioned in the markets
that neoliberalism seeks to free. This is easy to see, while
Latina/o workers and business elites might find a common base
of solidarity in nationalistic opposition to development practices
and dependency relations, neoliberal reforms tend to exacerbate
interclass differences, pitting Latina/o business elites against
workers and other groups that suffer the impact of neoliberal
policies. At the same time that neoliberal policies promote in-
54. For example, the events through which Latin American political parties began
to embrace the neoliberal world view prescribing state retrenchment and external open-
ing can be easily read critically through either development or dependency discourses.
See, e.g., Rosario Espinal, Development, Neoliberalism and Electoral Politics in Latin
America, in 23 DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE 27-48 (1992) (linking the allegiance to neo-
liberalism among Latin American political parties and movements to the deepening eco-
nomic crisis and increasing external pressures to deal with the debt problem in the early
1980s).
55. Id. As Espinal explains:
the assessment of contemporary Latin American society that lies at the heart
of Latin American neoliberalism [is]: first, that the economic crisis [in Latin
America] served to unravel the problems inherent in developmentalism, and
second, the notion that a renewed liberalism was a good sign of pragmatism
and modernity .... For [neoliberals], the main problem in Latin America was
not dependency, but the burden of an inefficient and corrupt state that pre-
vented growth and modernization.
Id. (emphasis added).
56. Lothian, supra note 45, at 175-79.
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terclass conflict, neoliberal discourse suppresses any recognition
of the relationship between the structure of the market and the
history of colonialism or the current structure of the interstate
system.5 7
These points can be illustrated by examining the way neo-
liberal discourse intervenes in the debate over alternative pro-
posals to link human rights enforcement to international eco-
nomic law. In this context, our assessments of the human rights
linkage are made to depend on how such linkages will impact the
operation of the free market. Thus, neoliberal discourse tends to
organize opposition to any human rights linkages (whether uni-
lateral or multilateral), arguing that the level of human rights in
a country is, and should be, dependent on the level of wealth and
capital accumulation. Put differently, neoliberals argue that
Third World countries must achieve a certain level of wealth be-
fore they can be reasonably held to international standards of
human rights. Efforts to impose human rights on Third World
states are attacked as a form of disguised protectionism.58 Of
course, this position generates its own counterposition, namely
that respect for human rights is a condition precedent to organiz-
ing a viable market economy. 59 Indeed, the argument is that
Third World countries will remain susceptible to the cycles of
military authoritarian dictatorships, government takeovers, and
civil war, all of which destroy the free market, until respect for
57. For example, some argue that the interstate system of unequal states is a con-
dition precedent and inevitable consequence of international capitalism. See, e.g.,
CHASE-DUNN, supra note 49. Ironically enough, while free markets and free trade may
protect domestic economic activity from the corruption and repression of a state appara-
tus controlled by a domestic elite (e.g. a military-bureaucratic elite or the officials of a
populist state), it also increases the likelihood that domestic economic activity will be
controlled by a foreign class elite, the multinationals enjoying privileged access to private
capital, core state subsidies, and distribution networks in their nations of origin. Id.
58. Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, The Promotion of International Labor Standards and
NAFTA- Retrospect and Prospects, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 427, 443 n.68 (1995) (describing
the opposition with which developing countries responded to the Bush Administrations
efforts to include worker rights as an agenda item in the Uruguay Round, viewing it as a
means to introduce additional trade restrictions or to suppress their legitimate compara-
tive advantage).
59. See, e.g., Lothian, supra note 45, at 182 (arguing that policies promoting eco-
nomic equality are both the preconditions for and the consequence of economic progress.
Economic equality is a precondition because sustained economic growth depends on re-
forms such as land redistribution and educational investment. Reduction of economic
inequality is also a consequence of economic progress because "the acceleration of eco-
nomic experimentalism ... provides an opportunity to carry further the campaign against
large and rigid inequalities.")
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basic human rights is secured in these countries.
From a different perspective, the neoliberal ideal can be con-
tested by examining the extent to which it is grounded on the
right to property, the scope of that right and the enforcement
regimes such a discourse could sustain. In other words, would
the steps taken to protect the right to property under the Cuban
Liberty and Solidarity Act compare favorably or unfavorably to
the steps that might have to be taken to secure adequate com-
pensation for the indigenous communities displaced from their
communal lands by World Bank development projects?
The linkage debate implicates issues that need to be debated
through a number of theoretical models. Developing a program
of action and advocacy depends first on understanding how this
debate can promote different alliances and confrontations be-
tween different segments of the Latina/o population, depending
on the discourse through which alternative linkages are repre-
sented. Understanding how to maneuver through these various
discourses is thus a first step toward combating the manipula-
tion of Latina/o political identities and alliances. Nevertheless,
the ultimate goal must be to confront on a normative and practi-
cal basis the question of the political identities through which
the LatCrit movement should intervene in developing the inter-
section of international human rights and international economic
law.
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